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The Dominant Undertaking’s Prices and 
Discounts 
 
 
 
 
LUND - 24 November 2014 
Different texts on Competition Law 
Am I correct in understanding you can choose 
different books for this course? 
  
Dias 2 
 However, none outlines discounts in detail 
Instead, they focus on various aspects of Article 
102 
 
 
 
Dias 3 
Some interesting insights on discounts 
In cases such as UBS & Michelin, the 
Court of Justice held: 
“The dominant position thus referred to by Article [102] relates 
to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers” 
 
This essentially defines dominance 
as the ability to ignore customers. 
 
 
Dias 4 
Why discounts? 
Nevertheless, even dominant companies offer 
their customers discounts and discounts 
programs 
 
 
 
Dias 5 
In reality, discounts are everywhere 
Dias 6 
Why discounts? 
Two explanations, of which (only) one is anti-
competitive  
 
 
 
Dias 7 
The anti-competitive explanation 
a) The anti-competitive explanation revolves 
around a foreclosure strategy (customer 
foreclosure) where customers, through a loyalty 
program (discounts), are reserved for the 
dominant undertaking and denied for the 
competitors 
Dias 8 
However, there is an alternative explanation 
b) Some people are willing (and able) to spend more 
(money) than others, and hence pay a higher 
price 
Dias 9 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 10 
While some people are willing (and able) 
to pay a higher price, others are not. 
That explains the negative relation 
between price (p) and demand (q). High 
price = low demand 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 11 
This partly explains why luxury & 
discount products are attributed 
to the same product market and 
remain alternative 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 12 
Some companies address the 
challenge by offering a broad 
program with different sub-brands 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 13 
While others use discounts or 
bundles to differentiate the price 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 14 
Discounts are therefore (also) an 
instrument to expand the market by 
meeting those consumers unwilling to 
pay full price 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 15 
 The alternative 
explanation 
merits some 
policy 
implications 
A prudent approach is required 
1. It’s too simplistic to consider discounts as anti- 
competitive per se because other explanation 
are avaliable 
Dias 16 
Foreclosure must be plausible 
2. Condemnation should be reserved to discounts 
(truly) able to create a foreclosure effect or (at a 
minimum) a risk, and it should fall upon the 
Commission to establish this 
 
Dias 17 
Loyalty is perhaps mislabeling 
3. Under the anti-competitive story. Who gets the 
discount? 
1. The super-loyal customers with no intention of 
switching 
2. The less loyal customers predominantly with the 
dominant undertaking 
3. The disloyal customer predominantly with the 
competitor 
Dias 18 
Effect, not form, should matter 
4. Reserving condemnation to anti-competitive 
discounts requires a wider approach to the latter, 
as discounts could: 
a) be loyalty-inducing, replacing a formal 
exclusive agreement leading to a customer 
foreclose 
b) loss-making and selective within the concept 
of predatory pricing 
c) bundle products or services combing an 
exploitation of consumer and foreclosure of 
competitor  
d) have discriminatory effect distorting 
competition downstream 
 
 
Dias 19 
Turning to reality and the appraisal of discounts 
Dias 20 
Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I establish the 
foundation 
In Hoffmann La Roche (recital 90), it was found abusive: 
 
“ …if the [dominant] undertaking, without…...a formal 
obligation, applies, either under the terms of 
agreements concluded with these purchaser or 
unilaterally, a system of fidelity rebates..” 
 
 
 
 
Dias 21 
Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I establish the basis 
Michelin I (recital 73) establish that a discount should be 
assessed against: 
“..all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and 
rules for the grant of the discounts, and to investigate 
whether, in providing an advantage not based in any 
economic service justifying it, the discounts tends to 
remove or restrict the buyers’s freedom to choose his 
source of supply, to bar competitors from access to the 
market…”  
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 22 
Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I establish the basis 
1. Effect instead of form matters, and a discount 
replacing a formal exclusive agreement is 
assessed by the same principles: 
a) In Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I, the discounts 
where offered as individualized target discounts 
estimated against the previously years acquisitions  
b) In Hoffmann La Roche, the discount was calculated 
across different products, and therefore had a 
bundling element. This was taken further by Napir 
Brown where delivery was included and hence 
involved a bundle (product + delivery) 
c) In Soda – Solvay & Irish Sugar the discounts where 
offered on extra acquisitions (top slides discounts) 
but in contrast to Michelin I only calculated on the top 
slides 
 
 
 
 
Dias 23 
Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I establish the basis 
1. Effect instead form matters, and a discount 
replacing a formal exclusive agreement is 
assessed by the same principles: 
d) In Van den Bergh Foods, the discounts came in the 
form of free freezers reserved for the supplier’s 
products. Arguing that space in a kiosk is limited, de 
facto exclusivity was identified by the Commission 
e) In Intel, cash payment was sided with a discount 
(referred to as naked restraints) and a perception 
with the buyer sufficient to identify exclusivity 
 
 
 
 
Dias 24 
Effect rather than form - exceptions 
1. Effect instead of form matters, and a discount 
replacing a formal exclusive agreement is 
assessed by the same principles: 
a) an advantage … based [on] economic 
service justifying it c.f. Michelin I. Hence, 
cost reductions can be passed on 
b) The Coca Cola settlement (1990) indicates 
that individualized target discounts might be 
allowed if the reference period is (very) short, 
in effect limiting the sucking. 
c) The Enforcement Paper (2009) outlines more 
detailed principles 
 
 
 
 
Dias 25 
Effect rather than form - Enforcement Paper 
• The Enforcement Paper (2009) outlines more 
detailed principles 
a) Top slides discounts (Soda – Solvay & Irish 
Sugar) should be appraised as predatory pricing 
limiting abuse to when marginal price (price per 
extra units) failing to cover the dominant 
undertakings AAC/AVC thereby potentially 
excluding an equally efficient competitor 
b) The same applies for volume discounts and 
selective price cuts awarded unconditional 
 An approach largely adopted in Post Danmark I, 
where the Court of Justice excluded that 
(unconditional) price cut covering AIC could be 
considered abusive 
 
 
 
 
Dias 26 
Effect rather than form - Enforcement Paper 
• The Enforcement Paper (2009) outlines more 
detailed principles 
c) Combo discounts, e.g., “buy two get an extra 
free” (mixed bundling), are appraised 
against an effect test and an equally efficient 
competitors (AEC) ability to meet the offer 
d) The same applies for discounts offered 
subject to conditions, e.g., 10 % increase 
over last year and with a retro element 
(calculated on the basis of earlier 
acquisitions) 
 
 
 
Dias 27 
Effect rather than form - Enforcement Paper 
• The Enforcement Paper (2009) outlines more 
detailed principles 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 28 
Popcorn  = EUR 3 
Soda   = EUR 3 
Combo = EUR 5 
(Discount  = EUR 1) 
(effective price for 
soda/popcorn = EUR 2) 
If an AEC stand-alone supplier can meet the 
EUR 2 effective price, there is no foreclosure 
and thus no abuse 
Effect not form should matter 
4. Reserving condemnation to anti-competitive 
discounts requires a wider approach to the latter, 
as discounts could: 
a) be loyalty-inducing, replacing a formal 
exclusive agreement leading to a customer 
foreclose 
b) Loss-making and selective within the concept 
of predatory pricing 
c) bundle products or services combing an 
exploitation of consumer and foreclosure of 
competitor  
d) have discriminatory effect distorting 
competition downstream 
 
 
Dias 29 
Effect not form should matter 
4. Reserving condemnation to anti-competitive 
discounts requires a wider approach to the latter 
because discounts could: 
a) loyalty inducing and bundle discounts are 
appraised under the AEC test, reserving 
condemnation to situations when a 
foreclosure are plausible 
 The AEC test was used in Tomra (2006) & 
Intel (EC Commission 2009) essentially to 
check the conclusions. However, in the latter 
the Commission maintained that it was not 
under any such obligation 
d) have discriminatory effect distorting 
competition downstream 
 
 
Dias 30 
Hoffmann La Roche & Michelin I establish the basis 
Hoffmann La Roche and Michelin I establish the 
basis for assessing discrimination. In the latter 
(recital 73), the discounts were also held to be 
abusive for offering:  
“dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaction with 
other trading parties….” 
 
Giving ground to the misperception that dominant 
undertakings are obligated to offer all customers 
similar (good or bad) conditions and adjust any 
discount program accordantly 
 
 
 
Dias 31 
Discriminatory discounts 
 That was corrected by, e.g., BdKEP/Deutsche Post 
(2004) where in recital 93 the Commission held that:  
 ”The wording [of Article 102] covers three types of 
discrimination, the first two of them exclusionary and 
the last one exploitative: (i) the customer of the 
dominant firm is placed at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the dominant firm itself; (ii) in relation to other 
customers of the dominant firm; or (iii) the customer 
suffers commercially in such a way that its ability to 
compete in whatever market is impaired” 
 Thus, discrimination & discriminatory discounts are 
only condemned if exclusionary under the AEC test or 
abusive by other standards 
 
 
 
Dias 32 
The alternative explanation 
Dias 33 
Discounts are therefore (also) an 
instrument to expand the market by 
meeting those consumer unwilling to pay 
the full price 
Exploitative discounts 
Targeting the individual willingness to pay could potentially 
be held as abusive as held by the Commission in the 
Discussion Paper (2005) predating Enforcement Paper. In 
recital 141 its was noted: 
“The direct exploitation takes places by discriminating 
between customers and making customers with a higher 
willingness to pay and less switching possibilities pay a 
higher price than others“ 
However, the consideration was not cited in the 
Enforcement Paper nor supported by case law. Deutsche 
Bahn (recital 91), UBS (recital 228) & Port of Helsingborg 
(241) don’t condemn (per se) behavior capitalizing on 
(some) customers’ higher willingness to pay, thereby 
potentially opening a (small) window 
Dias 34 
A happy ending? 
• Would have been wonderful if I could stop the story 
here and conclude that a coherent frame for assessing 
discounts now had been established. In short, a happy 
ending 
 
 
 
Dias 35 
Regrettably things are less clear 
• First, the Discussion Paper from 2005 reserves the 
right to condemn discounts capitalizing on (some) 
customers willingness to pay a premium ignoring older 
case law as Deutsche Bahn (1997), UBS (1978) & Port 
of Helsingborg (2004). The idea was dropped in the 
latter Enforcement Paper, but perhaps not forgotten 
• Second, it’s still unclear how to approach national 
discrimination, e.g., discounts reserved for either 
certain citizens or more likely customers within the 
proximity of a border and consequently more prone to 
switch. Whish isolates the “problem” in a separate 
chapter on “Pricing Practice that are Harmful to the 
Single Market” pp. 764-766 and Faull & Nikpay pp. 
404-407 (2007 version) largely do the same - thereby 
ignoring the problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 36 
Regrettably things are less clear 
• Third, and more problematic, BdKEP/Deutsche Post 
identified three forms of discrimination of which we 
only have addressed two: 
• ”The wording [of Article 102] covers three types of discrimination, 
the first two of them exclusionary and the last one exploitative: 
(i) the customer of the dominant firm is placed at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the dominant firm itself; (ii) in relation to 
other customers of the dominant firm; or (iii) the customer suffers 
commercially in such a way that its ability to compete in whatever 
market is impaired.” 
• Discounts reserved to groups of customers, and not 
others, could be considered abusive if distortive. 
However, how much distortion is required? 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 37 
Regrettably things are less clear 
• Fourth, and (even more troublesome), the General 
Court used Intel (2014) to state that: 
a) the Enforcement Paper (recital 155-156) 
doesn’t govern cases predating its adoption 
b) there are no requirement (recital 80) to 
conduct an effect analysis for exclusivity 
rebate thereby killing the Enforcement Paper 
and its approach 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 38 
Intel? 
• Much can be (and has been) said on Intel. 
Currently, it is on appeal to the Court of Justice 
and the mandatory use of the Enforcement Paper 
has been tabled in a separate case (Post 
Danmark II) before the same, thus giving a double 
chance to set the record straight.  Hence, we will 
be much wiser on the issue in a couple of years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 39 
Intel? 
• Until then, a cautious approach is advised outside 
the window established by early practice 
a) cost reductions c.f. Michelin I 
b) Short reference periods c.f. the Coca Cola 
settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dias 40 
Cases cited 
• Case C-85/76 - Hoffmann La Roche 
• Case C-27/76 - UBS 
• Case C-322/81 - Michelin I 
• IP/90/7 - coca cola 
• Case T-229/94 - Deutsche Bahn 
• COMP/A.36.568/D3 - Scanlines Sverige AB vs. Port of 
Helsingborg  
• Case C-549/10P - Tomra 
• COMP/C3/37-37.990 - Intel & case T-286/09 - Intel 
• Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark I 
• Case C-23/14 - Post Danmark II 
 
 
 Dias 41 
Questions 
 
Dias 42 
Or contact me on cbe@jur.ku.dk 
